Within contests, adjudication errors imply at the same time the exclusion of a meritorious candidate and the inclusion of a non-meritorious one. We study theoretically how adjudication errors affect effort, by disentangling the respective effects of exclusion and inclusion errors, showing how risk aversion, loss aversion and the framing of incentives shape these effects. Our experimental evidence indicates that mis-judgements decrease effort, with exclusion and inclusion errors having negative effects of similar magnitude. Penalty framings increase effort, relative to prize framings, while the effects of mis-judgements are found to be similar across framings: in order to increase effort, the stick is preferable to the carrot, without enhancing the disincentive effects of mis-judgements.
Introduction
The best candidate does not always win. Contests are used to allocate resources in many situations of everyday life (e.g., hirings, promotions, research grants allocations, university admissions, sport tournaments, elections, etc.). They are also used as incentive schemes to extract maximum effort from contestants (e.g., bonus schemes). Even though evaluation committees of such competitions try at their best to abide by fair procedures and objective criteria, judgement errors may occur, preventing the correct identification of the best candidate. As a consequence, the possible occurrence of adjudication errors can undermine the incentive to exert effort.
Most of the contest theory literature is about non-deterministic contests. Previous research has represented the possibility of errors in contests in many different ways, sharing the common feature that higher relative effort does not necessarily imply success. 1 The possibility of errors is described by a success function that maps effort levels into probabilities of winning. Different representations of the success function have been proposed. In contestsà la Tullock (1980) , originally introduced to describe rent seekers' attempts to condition policy outcomes, a contestant's probability of winning equals the ratio between the contestant's effort and the sum of all contestants' efforts. While Tullock contests introduce uncertainty in the mapping between effort and success, another strand of the literature, initiated by Lazear and Rosen (1981) , represents errors by introducing a wedge between actual and observable effort, thus adding random noise to contestants' effort. This implies that the allocation of prizes is decided on the basis of observable characteristics that misrepresent the effort actually exerted by contestants.
Previous experimental research has found that noise in the prize adjudication has a negative effect on effort in tournaments (e.g., List et al., 2014 and Delfgaauw et al., 2011) . Sheremeta et al. (2012) find that deterministic contests generate higher efforts than proportional-prize and probabilistic contests and that effort generally deceases when the noise variance increases. Yet, to the best of our knowledge no experimental paper so far has analyzed the mechanisms through which random errors affect contestants' effort and how this mechanisms vary depending on preferences (risk neutrality, risk aversion or loss aversion) and on the framing of incentives (positive or negative incentives schemes).
The starting point of our analysis is the observation that adjudication errors have a dual nature, an important feature that so far has been neglected in the economic literature on contests. Adjudication errors imply at the same time an unjust exclusion, as a deserving candidate is not rewarded (exclusion error), and an unjust inclusion, as an undeserving candidate is rewarded (inclusion error). In psychology, the duality of errors in contests has been studied by authors working in the field of behavioral decision making (e.g., Hammond, 1996; Thorngate and Carroll, 1990; Thorngate et al., 2009 ). However, this strand of research is mostly interested in how evaluation committees make their judgements, and thus focuses on the behavioral aspects and erroneous procedures that may distort their decisions. Less attention is paid to how, in turn, mis-judgements affect the behavior of contestants. Within economics, the duality of errors has been discussed within the literature on crime (e.g., Png, 1986 , Kaplow and Shavell, 1994 , Polinsky and Shavell, 2009 ). More recently, Rizzolli and Stanca (2012) found in a laboratory experiment that the possibility of convicting an innocent (exclusion error) makes deterrence of criminal behavior less effective than the possibility of acquitting a guilty individual (inclusion error).
In non-trivial contests, where the number of contested resources is smaller than the number of competitors, exclusion and inclusion errors generally occur simultaneously, representing two sides of the same coin. However, exclusion and inclusion errors are conceptually distinct. Most importantly, they represent two different channels through which mis-judgements may affect contestants' effort decisions. Understanding the role played by exclusion and inclusion errors for effort provision is important for the design of optimal competitive incentive mechanisms. Contest organizers may internalize the fact that adjudication errors can occur and, depending on the economic context, they may place more importance on minimizing the occurrence of either exclusion or inclusion errors. 2 In fact, while trying to avoid either type of error, they may incur in the other type. They may decide to adopt a permissive (strict) reward scheme in order to avoid excluding (including) the deserving (undeserving) candidate, making in turn exclusion (inclusion) more likely to occur. However, it is not clear which is the lesser evil: is it more disincentivizing to be lenient or strict when rewarding effort?
To answer these questions, we analyze how adjudication errors undermine effort in a very simple strategic context, where two symmetric contestants compete for a monetary prize in an all-pay auction (Hillman and Riley, 1989) with complete information. Similarly to Baye et al. (2005) , 3 we assume that errors are independent of effort levels, as with some arbitrary probability the higher bidder wins the contest and with the complementary probability, due to exogenous noise, the lower bidder wins. 4 We decompose an adjudication error into its exclusion and inclusion components and compare their effects on bids. We start by characterizing the equilibrium bidding behavior in the presence of adjudication errors under the assumption of risk neutrality. We then study how risk aversion and loss aversion influence the effects of adjudication errors. 5 By doing so, we provide different interpretations of the comparative effects of exclusion and inclusion on effort, and provide a better understanding of the disincentive effects of adjudication errors.
For any preferences, adjudication errors have a negative impact on effort. While making winning the contest less valuable -due to the possible exclusion error -they also make losing less unattractive -due to the possible inclusion error. Both effects disincentivize effort. In the presence of risk neutral bidders, exclusion and inclusion have the same negative impact on effort, as they reduce its marginal return by the same amount. Risk aversion makes exclusion more detrimental than inclusion: under the assumption that marginal utility is decreasing in monetary outcomes, bidders perceive a larger marginal dis-utility from the exclusion outcome (when the winner does not obtain the reward) relative to the inclusion outcome (when the loser receives the reward). Loss aversion also exacerbates the negative effects of exclusion relative to inclusion, although the interpretation is different: the loss associated with the erroneous exclusion in case of winning looms larger than the gain associated with the erroneous inclusion in case of losing. However, this result does not apply in the same way under different framings of the reward scheme. We show that in a financially equivalent reward structure where, instead of a prize to the winner, a penalty is assigned to the loser, 6 loss aversion produces opposite results and makes the effect of inclusion equal to or stronger than that of exclusion. In contrast, risk aversion produces the same asymmetric effects in both positive and negative incentive schemes.
We test our theoretical predictions in a laboratory experiment, where we manipulate independently inclusion and exclusion errors, and the framing of the incentive scheme (positive vs. negative), in a 2x2x2 design. We find that judgement errors negatively affect bids, with exclusion and inclusion errors contributing equally to the disincentive effects of adjudication errors. Interestingly, consistent with the theory, bids are significantly higher when incentives are framed as penalties, both in the absence of errors and in the presence of adjudication errors. 7 Yet, no significant interaction is found between the framing of the incentive scheme and the disincentive effects of judgement errors. Overall, the results indicate that, when judging merit in contests, being strict is equivalent to being lenient in order to maximize effort, but it may be preferable to the extent that it is less costly. In addition, while the stick is preferable to the carrot in order to increase effort, it does not exacerbate the disincentive effects of mis-judgements.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. Section 3 discusses the experimental design. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Framework
Consider an all-pay auction with complete information where two symmetric bidders, endowed with w ≥ 0, simultaneously choose their bids, b 1 and b 2 , where b i ∈ [0, w], i = 1, 2, to obtain a monetary prize π ≤ w, which is assigned to the higher bidder (ties are broken randomly).
We introduce the possibility that an adjudication error occurs, so that merit, i.e., the reward, is assigned to the lower and not to the higher bidder. An adjudication error implies two types of error at once: an error of exclusion, whereby merit is denied to the higher bidder -and the reward is assigned to none of the two, and an error of inclusion, whereby merit is attributed to the lower bidder -and the reward is assigned to both. On the basis of this conceptual distinction, we disentangle the two errors (exclusion and inclusion) and analyze how they affect equilibrium bids.
We assume that errors occur with a positive probability p ∈ (0, 1 2 ). 8 For simplicity, we assume that errors are independent of effort levels.
Linear Preferences
In what follows we describe our baseline model. We assume that bidders are risk neutral, i.e., their Bernoulli utility function of monetary outcomes u(·) is linear, and that u(x) = x. We will relax this assumption in Section 2.2.
6 Examples of penalties in the workplace are demotion, wage cut, dismissal, unpaid leave of absence, etc.
7 Several field and lab experimental studies have provided evidence that negative incentives induce more effort than positive incentives in non-competitive environments (see e.g. Brooks et al., 2011; Hossain and List, 2012; Fryer et al., 2012; Armantier and Boly, 2015) .
8 The assumption that p < 1 2 is without loss of generality and guarantees that, in every error setting and for every such p, there exists a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Propositions 1-4 characterize the Nash equilibrium bidding behavior in every error scenario: no adjudication error -used as a benchmark -indicated with label N , exclusion error (label E), inclusion error (label I), and adjudication error (label A). 9 Under risk neutrality, the benchmark is a standard symmetric all pay auction with complete information. The adjudication error scenario is a complete information version of Baye et al. (2005) extended model of litigation with random merit. 10 We omit the derivation of the results presented in this section. The proof of Proposition 1 follows immediately from the proof of Theorem 1 in Baye et al. (1996) that characterizes the Nash equilibrium of a standard all pay auctions with two or more bidders and homogeneous valuations. The behavioral predictions presented in Proposition 2-4 can be easily derived from Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 (No errors)
In the all-pay auction without errors there exists a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, such that both players play a continuous mixed strategy on the support
Next, we consider the setting where an exclusion error may occur (with probability p). Denote with q i (b i , b j ) the probability that bidder i receives the monetary reward π, given bids profile (b i , b j ), and define it as
that is, while the lower bidder never receives the reward, the higher bidder receives it only when no exclusion error occurs, i.e., with probability 1 − p. Thus, when the exclusion error occurs (with probability p), neither bidder receives the reward.
The equilibrium bidding behavior in the exclusion error scenario can be immediately derived from that described in Proposition 1 by assuming that bidders compete for a prize of size (1 − p)π.
Proposition 2 (Exclusion error)
In the all-pay auction with exclusion errors there exists a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium such that both players play a continuous mixed strategy on
We now examine bidding behavior under inclusion errors. We define the probability of winning of player i, given bids profile (b i , b j ), as
Henceforth, to simplify the presentation of the theoretical results, we will indicate the equilibrium distribution function and the average equilibrium bid in each error scenario with the corresponding label. For example, F N is the equilibrium distribution function in the no-error scenario.
10 The random merit extension is contained in Appendix B of Baye et al. (2005) . From their model we can easily obtain our adjudication error scenario by assuming that their parameter π that indicates the probability of the exogenous shock is equal to 1 − 2p and that the litigation environment can be described as an all pay auction where each party pays its litigation cost (i.e., β = α = 1 in their model).
that is, while the higher bidder always receives the reward, when the inclusion error occurs (with probability p) also the lower bidder receives it. Thus, when an inclusion error occurs, both bidders receive the reward.
The equilibrium bidding behavior in the inclusion error scenario can be easily derived from the equilibrium bidding behavior of the benchmark by assuming that players compete to get a monetary prize equal to (1 − p)π (instead of π) and whichever the outcome they are granted a payoff of at least pπ -i.e., the expected utility from bidding zero.
Proposition 3 (Inclusion error) In the all-pay auction with inclusion errors, there exists a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium such that both players randomize continu-
Thus, the equilibrium bidding behavior in the presence of either exclusion or inclusion errors coincide and for p > 0 the average equilibrium bid in either case is lower than in the no-error scenario. That is, exclusion and inclusion produce the same negative effect on effort.
We finally examine equilibrium bidding behavior when an adjudication error occurs with probability p. In this case, both exclusion and inclusion are present: the higher bidder does not receive the reward, which is instead assigned to the lower bidder. Thus, we define the probability of receiving the reward for player i, given bids profile (b i , b j ), as
The expected bid in the adjudication error scenario can be easily derived from Proposition 1 by assuming that players compete to get a monetary prize of size (1 − 2p)π (instead of π) and that, as in the inclusion error case, whichever the outcome they are granted a payoff of at least pπ.
Proposition 4 (Adjudication error)
In the all-pay auction with adjudication errors there exists a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium such that both players randomize
Hence, the average equilibrium bid is lower than in the no-error scenario. Notice that, due to linearity,
i.e., the effect of an adjudication error on expected equilibrium bids is equal to the sum of the effects of its exclusion and inclusion components.
Risk Preferences
In this section, we relax the assumption of linear preferences and analyze the effects of mis-judgements on effort under more general assumptions on risk attitudes. We derive the equilibrium behavior of bidders with a generic Bernoulli utility function of monetary outcomes u(·) such that u (x) ≥ 0 and u(0) = 0. Since we cannot derive explicit solutions starting from a generic u(·), we compare qualitatively the equilibrium behavior in the different error scenarios by studying the equilibrium distribution functions and their supports.
Notice that by keeping the assumption that utility is increasing in monetary outcomes, the basic trade-off of standard all-pay auctions prevails in every error scenario: increasing the bid increases the probability of winning but decreases the monetary payoff. Thus, since errors either decrease the expected utility from winning (exclusion error) or increase the expected utility from losing (inclusion error) or both (adjudication error), it is not surprising that even under more general assumptions on preferences mis-judgements decrease average effort with respect to the benchmark.
In every error scenario it is still optimal to play a continuous mixed strategy on a support that has a lower bound in zero, as u(x) is increasing in the monetary outcome x. While in the benchmark without errors the upper bound of the support remains π, i.e., the prize value, as in the baseline model with risk neutral preferences, in the other error scenarios the upper bounds change with respect to the risk neutral case. Even though upper bounds cannot be derived explicitly without assuming any specific functional form, we can rank them. This allows us to compare average equilibrium bids across error scenarios.
Consider the setting without errors. The equilibrium distribution function, that we call F N (b), satisfies the indifference condition:
where the left hand side represents the expected utility from any bid b while the right hand side is the expected utility from bidding zero. Thus, the equilibrium distribution function is equal to:
.
In equilibrium bidders play continuous mixed strategy on the support [0, π] according to F N (·). 11
In the exclusion error scenario, where the highest bidder may not receive the reward, the equilibrium distribution function F E (b) must satisfy the indifference condition:
from which we obtain that
In the inclusion error setting, where the lowest bidder may receive the reward, the equilibrium distribution function F I (b) must satisfy the indifference condition:
11 Recall that the upper bound of the support of F N (·) can be found by imposing that the expected utility from bidding exactly the upper bound (and winning) is equal to the expected utility from bidding zero. It is immediate to verify that π solves u(w + π − b) = u(w) (i.e., equation (1) so that
It is immediate to show that in each error scenario X = A, E, I, in equilibrium bidders play a symmetric continuous mixed strategy on the support [0,
where b X is such that F X (b X ) = 1 and solves the relative indifference condition.
While in the risk neutral case exclusion and inclusion errors produce the same negative effect on average bids, for generic risk preferences, this relation is ambiguous and depends on the second derivative of u(·). To establish a univocal relation between expected bids in the two error settings, let us assume that u(·) is concave and compare expected bids in the presence of the two types of errors when bidders are risk averse. We can state the following proposition (the proof is in Appendix A).
Proposition 5 When bidders are risk averse, exclusion errors have a stronger negative effect on average equilibrium bids than inclusion errors.
The intuition is the following. Due to decreasing marginal utility, the marginal disutility from the exclusion outcome (u (w −b)) -i.e., the winner does not receive the reward -is larger than the marginal dis-utility from the inclusion outcome (u (w + π − b)) -i.e., the loser receives the reward. In other words, the exclusion error raises the cost of bidding more than the inclusion error with respect to the benchmark. Thus, for risk averse bidders, exclusion generates a stronger distortion, relative to inclusion, on the incentives to exert effort. Obviously, the opposite relation holds for risk-loving bidders, as their marginal utility is increasing in monetary outcomes.
Consider now the setting with adjudication errors, where the reward might be assigned to the lower rather than to the higher bidder. The equilibrium distribution function, that we call F A (b), satisfies the indifference condition:
where the left hand side is the expected utility from any positive bid b, that depends on whether b is the highest bid and on the probability that an error occurs (p), that affects the expected utility both in case of winning and in case of losing. The right hand side is the expected utility from bidding zero (and losing), which is affected by the positive probability of receiving the reward (due to inclusion). By re-arranging terms, we obtain that the distribution function that solves the equilibrium indifference condition (4) is
It is rather intuitive that under an adjudication error average equilibrium bids are lower than under an exclusion or an inclusion error. In the presence of an adjudication error both the disincentive effect of exclusion and that of inclusion are present. Therefore, the relation between average bids across error scenarios when bidders are risk averse is:
Loss Aversion
In this section we analyze the effects of adjudication errors on effort when bidders are loss averse. Specifically, we assume that the utility function of monetary outcomes u(x) is increasing in x and that u(x) = −λu(−x) for x < 0, with λ > 1. We also assume that bidders consider their endowment w as a reference point and evaluate monetary outcomes as positive or negative variations with respect to w. In what follows we first describe the effects of judgement errors on effort for loss averse bidders. Next, we show how loss aversion influences these effects.
Under loss aversion the equilibrium distribution function in the no error scenario becomes:
Loss averse bidders play a continuous mixed strategy on the support [0, π] according to F N (b).
When bidders evaluate monetary outcomes as variations (namely, gains or losses) relative to their endowment, exclusion generates a possible loss in case of winning, while inclusion generates a possible gain in case of losing. Thus, it is expected that both types of errors decrease average bids with respect to the benchmark. What is less immediate is the relation between the disincentive effect of an exclusion and an inclusion error.
The equilibrium distribution function under exclusion errors, becomes:
and bidders play a continuous mixed strategy on the support [0,
Under loss aversion, the equilibrium distribution function under inclusion errors, becomes:
We compare bidding behavior under exclusion and inclusion errors and show how loss aversion provides an alternative interpretation to risk aversion for why exclusion may have a stronger disincentive effect than inclusion. For loss averse bidders, the possible loss due to exclusion looms larger than the possible gain due to inclusion. Thus, exclusion gives rise to a harsher distortion of the incentive to exert effort with respect to inclusion, as bidders prefer avoiding the loss when winning to making the gain when losing. This intuition leads to the following proposition (the proof is in Appendix A).
Proposition 6 When bidders are loss averse, exclusion errors have a stronger negative effect on bids than inclusion errors.
Thus, as for risk averse bidders (see proposition (5)), also for loss averse bidders exclusion errors have a larger disincentive effect than inclusion errors.
It is rather intuitive that under an adjudication error, the average equilibrium bid of loss averse bidders will be lower than the average equilibrium bid in every other scenario -i.e., no-error, exclusion and inclusion. Indeed, under an adjudication error both the (expected) utility loss in case of winning and the (expected) utility gain in case of losing are present. Therefore, the relation between average equilibrium bids across error scenarios is the same as in the risk aversion case, i.e.,
Prize and Penalty Schemes
We have seen so far that under both risk aversion and loss aversion adjudication errors decrease average equilibrium bids and that its exclusive component generates a larger disincentive effect than the inclusive one. In this section we show how, differently from risk aversion, loss aversion provides different predictions on equilibrium bidding behavior in every error scenario depending on whether incentives are framed as losses instead of gains.
We call the reward structure based on monetary gains a prize scheme, and the alternative reward structure based on monetary losses a penalty scheme. The penalty scheme is such that the lowest bidder receives a monetary penalty and the highest bidder does not. Notice that, the two schemes provide contestants with the same incentives to exert effort as they both award merit to the highest bidder. Yet, rewards are different: instead of obtaining a prize, in a penalty scheme, the highest bidder avoids a penalty. When an adjudication error occurs, the penalty is assigned to the highest and not to the lowest bidder. An exclusion error implies that (also) the highest bidder unjustly receives the penalty, while an inclusion error implies that neither bidder receives it.
In order to make the penalty and the prize scheme financially equivalent, we assume that in the penalty scheme bidders are endowed with 2w, and that the penalty is as large as the prize π. Thus, monetary outcomes in every error scenario are algebraically identical across the two schemes. 14 Consider, for instance, the scenario without errors and call G N (·) the penalty scheme counterpart of F N (·) derived from condition (1). In a penalty scheme the equilibrium indifference condition for bidders endowed with a generic u(·) becomes
It is immediate to see that conditions (1) and (5) coincide, due to payoff equivalence, and that this equivalence relation applies to every error scenario. This implies that all the results presented in propositions 1-5 also hold in a penalty scheme. Thus, under risk aversion the two schemes are equivalent and every error generates the same disincentive effect.
However, under loss aversion, bidding behavior across the two schemes may differ. Every outcome in any error scenario of a penalty scheme is such that bidders bear at best the bid and at worst both the penalty and the bid. Thus, under loss aversion, condition (5) becomes:
Since all outcomes are in the loss domain, loss aversion does not have any bite in a penalty scheme and the equilibrium distribution function becomes
In what follows we assume that u(x) is linear in x so that u(x) = x for x ≥ 0 and u(x) = λx for x < 0, with λ > 1. With linear preferences, in every error setting, the average equilibrium bid of a penalty scheme coincides with the average equilibrium bid of the baseline model of Section 2.1 (prize scheme with standard linear preferences). Hence, it is equivalent to compare the predictions for a prize scheme with loss averse bidders with either the predictions for a penalty scheme with loss averse bidders or those of the simple setting of Section 2.1. Thus, on one hand comparing bidding behavior of loss averse bidders across a prize and a penalty scheme improves the understanding of why the two schemes may provide different incentives to exert effort, taking the possibility of errors into account. On the other hand, it serves the purpose of providing an interpretation to the role of loss aversion in shaping the disincentive effects of errors on bids in a prize scheme.
We first analyze the effect of loss aversion on expected bids in the benchmark without errors. We find that loss averse contestants bid less aggressively in a prize than in a penalty scheme, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 In a scenario without errors with loss averse bidders, bids in a penalty scheme are higher than in a prize scheme.
Proof. In a prize scheme without errors, any bid in the support of the equilibrium distribution function should provide the same expected utility from bidding zero, that is
which yields
As in the baseline model (standard all-pay auction with risk neutral bidders), the upper bound of the support -denote it b -must be equal to π. Suppose that it is lower than π. Then, any of the two bidders finds it profitable to bid slightly above b in order to win with certainty and increase his expected utility (due to the zero loss). Thus, the support of the equilibrium distribution function does not change with respect to the benchmark and coincides with [0, π] . We can derive the average equilibrium bid of loss averse bidders as
, which is the average equilibrium bid both in the baseline model with risk neutral bidders and in a penalty scheme with loss averse (risk neutral) bidders. Notice that E N (b) decreases with λ.
The intuition for this result is that loss averse bidders are more averse to the loss that derives from losing in a penalty scheme than they are attracted to the gain that derives from winning in a prize scheme. This result is in line with recent evidence showing that loss contracts increase individual and team performance in the workplace (see Section 5 for a discussion). Importantly, our result suggests that this may occur also in a competitive environment: negative incentive schemes may be more effective to extract effort as, due to loss aversion, contestants are more willing to exert effort in order to avoid losses.
Next, we analyze how loss aversion influences the effects of judgement errors on average bids by comparing equilibrium behavior across prize and penalty schemes, under exclusion and inclusion errors, respectively.
Proposition 8 Under loss aversion, for λ large enough, exclusion errors have a stronger negative effect on bids in a penalty scheme than in a prize scheme.
Proof. We derive the mixed strategy equilibrium of a prize scheme with exclusion errors with loss averse bidders by analogy with the mixed strategy equilibrium of the exclusion error scenario in the baseline model (with risk neutral bidders). Any bid in the support of the equilibrium distribution function should provide the same expected utility from bidding zero, that is
that yields
As in the baseline model the lower bound of the support of F E (b) is zero. Yet, the upper bound of the support of the equilibrium mixed strategy is different and it is equal to b = (1−p)π 1+p(λ−1) , which is obtained from condition (7) after substituting for F E (b) = 1. Thus, the average equilibrium bid of loss averse bidders is equal to
The disincentive effect of an exclusion error with loss averse bidders in a prize scheme is smaller relative to a penalty scheme if the following inequality holds true:
2 where the left hand side is the difference between the average bid in the no error scenario and the average bid in an exclusion error scenario of a prize scheme; the right hand side measures the effect of an exclusion error in a penalty scheme. It can be shown that this inequality is not satisfied for every (λ, p), such that λ > 1 and p ∈ (0, 1 2 ). Let us divide both sides for π and p and denote the resulting expression on the left hand side as D(λ, p). The above inequality becomes
For every p ∈ (0, 1 2 ) we can identify a threshold λ(p), that identifies the degree of loss aversion above which the inequality is satisfied, i.e., such that for λ > λ(p), D(λ, p) < 1 2 .
In the presence of exclusion errors, loss-averse contestants perceive a negative variation in their utility from winning the auction with respect to the benchmark that is smaller in a prize than in a penalty scheme, as the loss looms larger than the non-gain.
It can be shown that λ decreases with p, i.e., the more likely an exclusion error is, the less loss averse an individual needs to be in order to place lower bids in a penalty relative to a prize scheme. Indeed, when the probability of exclusion grows large, the differential between the negative variation in case of winning perceived in a penalty scheme and that perceived in a prize scheme is amplified.
Proposition 9 Under loss aversion, inclusion errors have a stronger negative effect on bids in a penalty scheme than in a prize scheme.
Proof.
We derive the mixed strategy equilibrium of a prize scheme with inclusion errors with loss averse bidders by analogy with the mixed strategy equilibrium of the inclusion error scenario in the baseline model (with risk neutral bidders). Any bid in the support of the equilibrium distribution function should provide the same expected utility from bidding zero, that is
The upper bound of the support of the equilibrium distribution function coincides with that of the inclusion error scenario of the baseline model, since the inclusion error does not affect the expected payoff from winning. Thus, it is equal to b = (1 − p)π. Hence, the average equilibrium bid of loss averse bidders is equal to
The disincentive effect of an inclusion error with loss averse bidders in a prize scheme is smaller relative to a penalty scheme if the following inequality holds:
where the left hand side is the difference between the average bid in the no error scenario and the average bid of an inclusion error scenario in a prize scheme; the right hand side measures the effect of an inclusion error in a penalty scheme. It can be shown that this inequality is satisfied for every (λ, p), such that λ > 1 and p ∈ (0, 1 2 ).
Similarly to the exclusion error, the disincentive effect of an inclusion error is larger in a penalty relative to a prize scheme. In the presence of inclusion errors, loss averse contestants perceive a positive variation in case of losing that is larger in a penalty scheme than in a prize scheme, as the avoided loss looms larger than the prize. However, inclusion, differently from exclusion, has an additional disincentive effect. Specifically, it affects the expected payoff from exerting zero effort, as in some contingencies the bidder receives the prize (prize scheme) or avoids the penalty (penalty scheme) at no cost. Since the non-penalty looms larger than the prize, inclusion induces a variation in the opportunity cost of effort that is asymmetric across the two reward structures: the opportunity cost increases more in a penalty scheme than in a prize scheme. Overall, these two effects of inclusion induce a disincentive effect that is unambiguously larger in a penalty relative to a prize scheme. 15 We now analyze how the effect of an adjudication error varies across the two reward schemes. By comparing the difference between the benchmark average equilibrium bid and the average equilibrium bid in the presence of adjudication errors, across the prize and the penalty scheme, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 10 Under loss aversion, adjudication errors have a stronger negative effect on bids in a penalty than in a prize scheme.
Proof. In a penalty scheme loss averse bidders behave like in the baseline model and play a continuous mixed strategy with support [0, (1 − 2p)π] according to the distribution function:
so that the average equilibrium bid is
. Thus, the difference between average equilibrium bids in the penalty scheme without and with adjudication errors can be computed as
In contrast, due to loss aversion, the equilibrium distribution function in a prize scheme differs with respect to the benchmark as it must satisfy the indifference condition
The upper bound of the support is derived from the condition that expected utility from the equilibrium strategy in the best case scenario (left hand side of condition (8) with F A (b) = 1) is equal to the expected utility from bidding zero. Thus, it is equal to b =
(1−2p)π 1+p(λ−1) .
The disincentive effect of an adjudication error with loss averse bidders in a prize scheme is computed as:
where the first term is the average equilibrium bid in the no error scenario (derived from the proof of Proposition 7) and the second term is the average equilibrium bid in the adjudication error scenario. We can rewrite the last expression as
It can be shown that this expression is (strictly) smaller than pπ for every λ > 1.
To summarize, when bidders are loss averse, average bids are lower in a prize scheme than in a penalty scheme, but the negative effect of adjudication errors on incentives is less strong in a prize scheme. 16 These results have interesting implications for the design of optimal contests. Under loss aversion, penalty schemes may better suit the objective of contest designers to maximize effort insofar as adjudication errors are absent. When instead adjudication schemes are defective and errors may occur, positive incentives has to be preferred to negative incentives.
We now analyze how the effects of the two components of an adjudication errorexclusion and inclusion -affect effort in a penalty scheme. To compare this result with that of Proposition 6, that compares the effect of exclusion and inclusion in a prize scheme, we weaken the linearity assumption and consider a generic u(x) increasing in its argument. The equilibrium distribution function under exclusion errors in a penalty scheme -that we denote G E (b) to distinguish it from the equilibrium distribution function of a prize scheme -satisfies:
Thus, for loss averse bidders, it is equal to:
with support [0,
The equilibrium distribution function under inclusion errors in a penalty scheme satisfies:
Thus, for loss averse bidders it is equal to:
16 An alternative way to state these results is that in the absence of errors loss aversion decreases average bids and it decreases the disincentive effect of an adjudication error.
Interestingly, the relation between exclusion and inclusion error that we expect in a prize scheme is completely reversed in a penalty scheme. By comparing the equilibrium bidding behavior in the two scenarios, we obtain the following proposition (the proof is in Appendix A).
Proposition 11 In a penalty scheme, when bidders are loss averse, inclusion errors have stronger negative effect on bids than exclusion errors.
Thus, similarly to risk aversion, loss aversion generates an asymmetry between the negative effects of exclusion and inclusion on average bids. However, the effect of loss aversion strongly depends on how the incentive scheme is framed and it does not characterize defective contests in general. In particular, it does not apply to environments where contest designers adopt penalty schemes to incentivize effort.
The results of propositions 5, 6 and 11 can be summarized as follows: with positive incentive schemes, both risk aversion and loss aversion imply that exclusion errors are more detrimental for effort than inclusion errors. In contrast, with negative incentive schemes, while the implications of risk aversion do not change, loss aversion has an opposite effect: exclusion has a less strong disincentive effect than inclusion.
The Experiment
The baseline experimental task is a standard all-pay auction where two subjects compete for a monetary reward. Subjects are matched in pairs and have a monetary endowment that they can spend to buy tickets at the cost of 1 Experimental Currency Unit (ECU) per ticket, where 1 ECU = 1 euro cent. The subject who buys most tickets wins the contest (ties are broken randomly). However, the winner of the contest may not obtain the monetary reward, depending on the occurrence of a random judgement error, as detailed below.
Design
We manipulate independently, in a 2x2x2 factorial design, the presence of exclusion and inclusion errors, and the framing of the incentive scheme (prize vs penalty). In all treatments, the highest bidder wins the contest. However, the identification of the winner (loser) of the contest may be subject to either exclusion or inclusion errors, or both. 17 In T1, no error occurs, so that the winner obtains the reward with certainty. In T2, an error of exclusion may occur with probability 1 4 . In T3, an error of inclusion may occur with probability 1 4 . In T4, an adjudication error may occur with probability 1 4 , implying both exclusion and inclusion at the same time.
To summarize, we implement the following four treatments:
T1 -No errors: the winner obtains the reward, while the loser does not obtain it;
17 The occurrence of an error is determined by a coin toss. Subjects are informed about the coin toss realization after their bidding decision.
T2 -Exclusion error:
-with probability 1 4 the winner does not obtain the reward (thus no bidder obtains the reward ); -with probability 3 4 the winner obtains the reward while the loser does not obtain it;
T3 -Inclusion error:
-with probability 1 4 the loser obtains the reward (thus both bidders obtain the reward ); -with probability 3 4 the winner obtains the reward while the loser does not obtain it;
T4 -Inclusion and Exclusion (Adjudication) error:
-with probability 1 4 the reward is assigned to the loser and not to the winner ; -with probability 3 4 the winner obtains the reward while the loser does not obtain it.
Each of these four treatments is implemented under two different framings, with the reward consisting of either receiving a monetary prize (Prize framing) or avoiding a monetary penalty (Penalty framing). In the Prize framing, subjects are endowed with 1000 ECUs and the reward is a prize of 1000 ECUs. For subjects who are awarded the prize, the payoff is given by the endowment, minus the cost of the tickets, plus the prize; for subjects who are not awarded the prize, the payoff is the endowment minus the cost of the tickets. In the Penalty framing, subjects are endowed with 2000 ECUs and compete to avoid a penalty of 1000 ECUs. For subjects who receive the penalty, the payoff is the endowment minus the cost of the tickets minus the penalty; for subjects who do not receive the penalty, the payoff is the endowment minus the cost of the tickets. The four treatments are therefore payoff-equivalent across the two framings. Table 1 summarizes the experimental design. Note: see Section 3.1 for details on the experimental treatments.
Hypotheses
Under standard risk-neutral preferences, Nash equilibrium strategy profiles and expected bids for each treatment can be summarized as follows. In T1, both players play a continuous mixed strategy with support [0, 1000] according to the distribution function Table 2 compares expected individual bids in ECUs for each of the four treatments. Note: expected bids in euro cents under the assumption of standard risk-neutral preferences (see Appendix A).
The first set of hypotheses is about the effects of judgement errors on bids. In the absence of reference-dependent preferences, irrespective of the framing of the task, adjudication errors are expected to have a negative effect on bids under any expected-utility preferences. This reflects two complementary effects: the exclusion error component decreases the expected utility of a winning bid; the inclusion error component increases the expected utility of a losing bid, thus decreasing the expected net returns from bidding. In addition, under linear utility no interaction is expected between exclusion and inclusion errors, so that the effects of adjudication errors are equal to the sum of exclusion and inclusion errors (additivity). Alternatively, under non-linear utility, exclusion and inclusion errors may be complement or substitutes.
If utility is linear in monetary outcomes, exclusion and inclusion errors have the same negative impact on the marginal return from bidding and, therefore, on expected bids. On the other hand, if utility is non-linear, the two errors have different effects on bids. Under risk aversion, the expected utility from bidding, both in case of winning and in case of losing, is lower in the presence of exclusion than inclusion errors. 19 Therefore, for a given error probability, risk averse individuals are expected to bid less in the presence of errors of exclusion than of inclusion. Hence, whereas under linear utility exclusion and inclusion errors have the same disincentive effect, under risk aversion exclusion errors have a stronger disincentive effect on bids than inclusion errors.
Summing up, we test the following hypotheses about the effects of judgement errors on effort:
H1a: Adjudication errors have a negative effect on bids.
H1b: Both exclusion and inclusion errors have a negative effect on bids.
18 Notice that to predict and interpret subjects' behavior in the experiment, we adopt the population interpretation for mixed strategies and do not assume that each subject actually randomizes. In fact, we do not provide subjects with any randomization device that they could use to pick a bid in the support. Thus, individual i's bid in the support [0, 1000] has to be interpreted as part of a continuous mixed strategy played by the sub-population from which i is drawn.
19 The reason for this result is that, in case of winning with probability 3 4 monetary outcomes are the same in T2 and T3, but with probability 1 4 the winner does not receive the reward and the payoff is lower in T3 than in T2. In case of losing, with probability 3 4 the payoff in T2 and in T3 is the same, but with probability 1 4 the loser receives the reward, so that the expected payoff is higher in T3 than T2.
H1c: The effects of exclusion and inclusion errors are non-additive.
H1d: Exclusion errors have a stronger disincentive effect on bids than inclusion errors.
The second set of hypotheses concerns the effects of the framing of the incentive scheme, and the interaction with judgement errors, focusing on the role played by loss aversion. Under expected-utility preferences, average bids are equal in the Prize and Penalty framings, irrespective of risk attitudes, since the monetary payoffs are exactly the same in the two settings. On the other hand, loss aversion would produce different bids, and different effects of judgement errors, in the two framings.
In the absence of errors, loss aversion implies that bids are higher in a penalty framing, since the loss perceived in case of losing in a penalty scheme weights more than a corresponding non-gain in a prize scheme. Hence bidders want to avoid losing in Penalty more than they want to avoid it in Prize. More importantly, under loss aversion adjudication errors have a stronger disincentive effect on bids in the Penalty than in the Prize framing (see Proposition 9). The intuition is the following: in a Penalty framing, loss averse subjects perceive a larger negative (positive) variation in the expected utility from winning (losing) with respect to the benchmark than in a Prize framing. Thus, the disincentive effect of adjudication errors is stronger in Penalty than in Prize. Similar predictions apply to inclusion errors, whereas the effect of the framing is ambiguous in the case of Exclusion errors (Propositions 7 and 8). Finally, as shown in Propositions 10 and 11, in the presence of loss aversion exclusion errors have a stronger disincentive effect on bids than inclusion errors in a prize framing, but not in a penalty framing. 20 As a consequence, the difference between the disincentive effects of exclusion and inclusion errors is larger in Prize than in Penalty.
Summing up, we test the following hypotheses about the effects of framing on bidding behavior in the presence of judgement errors:
H2a: In the absence of errors, bids are higher in Penalty than in Prize.
H2b: The disincentive effects of adjudication errors are stronger in Penalty than in Prize.
H2c: The disincentive effects of both exclusion and inclusion errors are stronger in Penalty than in Prize.
H2d:
The difference between the disincentive effects of exclusion and inclusion errors is larger in Prize than in Penalty.
Participants and Procedures
We recruited 256 participants among students at the University of Milan Bicocca using the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004) . Error-type treatments (Inclusion and Exclusion) were implemented within subjects. Framing treatments (Prize or Penalty) were implemented between subjects. We ran 8 sessions for each framing (Prize or Penalty) with 16 subjects per session. In each session, in either of the two framings, every subject faced all four error-type treatments (Exclusion x Inclusion), playing four phases of 10 rounds for each treatment (40 periods in total). In order to minimize the consequences of order effects, we implemented a cross-over design by varying the order of the four treatments across sessions, as illustrated in Table 3 (two sessions were run for each of the four sequences of treatments). Note: see Section 3.3 for details of the cross-over design.
In each round, groups of two subjects were formed by randomly drawing from fixed sets of four subjects. This matching procedure resulted in four independent matching-group observations per session, for a total of 64 independent group-level observations overall. In order to minimize repeated game effects, subjects were informed that groups would be randomly formed in each round.
In each session, upon arrival at the laboratory subjects were randomly assigned to computer terminals, located in cubicles that did not allow communication or visual interaction. To ensure public knowledge, instructions were distributed and read aloud separately for every treatment (see Appendix B for the instructions, translated from Italian). In order to check the understanding of the instructions subjects were asked to answer a set of control questions before starting each phase of ten rounds, and the phase started only after all subjects had answered the questions correctly. At the end of each round subjects were informed about both own and co-player's payoff in that round. At the end of the experiment subjects were paid in cash according to their performance in one of the 40 periods, randomly selected.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . Average earnings in the experiment were about 14 euros (including a participation fee of 2 euros), for sessions taking on average about 75 minutes.
Results
This section presents the experimental results. We start by providing an overview of bidding behavior across treatments. Next, we report test results for the effects of judgement errors. Finally, we focus on the interaction between judgement errors and the framing of the incentive scheme.
Overview
Figure 1 compares actual and theoretical bids, by treatment, pooling all subjects across the two framings. Observed bids are generally lower than theoretical bids under standard risk neutral preferences. This may reflect the effects of repetition, as each subject undergoes 40 bidding rounds overall. In the absence of judgement errors (T1), actual and theoretical bids are 445 and 500, respectively. Underbidding is also observed in the presence of exclusion error (T2, 308 vs. 375) and inclusion error (T3, 302 vs. 375). Actual and theoretical bids are instead relatively similar in the presence of adjudication errors (T4, 233 vs. 250). Across treatments, bidding behavior is qualitatively consistent with the theoretical predictions. The presence of adjudication errors produces a substantial reduction in average bids. Similarly, the presence of either exclusion or inclusion errors, separately, also reduces average bids, although the effect is smaller. Average bids are relatively similar in the presence of either exclusion or inclusion errors. The joint disincentive effect of the two types of error is smaller than the sum of the individual effects of exclusion and inclusion errors. Figure 2 illustrates the effects of repetition on bidding behavior within treatments. Observed and predicted bids are compared by treatment over 10 rounds, averaging across different phases (treatment-specific experience). Observed bids follow a similar pattern in each of the four treatments, being close to predicted bids in the initial rounds and declining thereafter over successive repetitions. The declining pattern within phases is, however, more pronounced in T2 and T3, while relatively less strong in T1 and T4. This indicates that the effects of repetition may differ across treatments. Figure 3 compares average bids, by treatment, in the Prize and Penalty framing, respectively. Average bids are higher in the Penalty scheme in each of the four treatments. The difference is larger in the absence of errors (T1) and in the presence of adjudication errors (T4), relative to exclusion (T2) or inclusion (T3) errors. While underbidding is observed in the Prize framing, average bids are very close to the theoretical predictions in the Penalty framing.
We do not find evidence of overbidding, which is in fact a widespread phenomenon observed in many experiments on contests. 21 It is worth noticing that overbidding mostly importantly, as discussed by Sheremeta (2013) , overbidding rates may depend on a series of characteristics of the experimental design, such as number of bidders, payoff structure (relative size of prize and endowment), experience (number of repetitions) and matching protocol. Among the existing experimental studies on symmetric auctions, the closest to ours in terms of payoff structure is Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006) . 23 However, while in our experiment bidders receive an endowment in every round, in their experiment bidders receive a large endowment only once at the beginning of the experiment. Thus, our subjects may perceive a more salient cap on their bids in each round. Moreover, in their experiment bidders are at least four. As the number of bidders is widely recognized to have a positive effect on overbidding, this may contribute to explain the difference with respect to our findings. 24
Effects of Judgements Errors
In order to test the effects of judgement errors on effort, we use a regression model that explains observed bids as a function of dummy variables for treatment effects (exclusion and inclusion errors), their interaction, and additional control variables to take into account the effects of repetition and possible session effects:
whereb i,t denotes group-level average bids (in Euro cents), with i = 1, ..., 64 indicating independent matching groups and t = 1, ..., 40 indicating periods. EXC i,t (IN C i,t ) is a dummy variable indicating whether group i can face an exclusion (inclusion) error in period t. EXC i,t is equal to 1 in treatments T2 and T4, while IN C i,t is equal to 1 in treatments T3 and T4. The vector x includes short-term experience (a dummy that takes value 0 for the first five rounds within each phase and 1 for the last five rounds), long-term experience (a dummy that takes value 0 for the first 20 periods within a session and 1 for the last 20 periods), and a full set of session dummy variables. Since the effects of truncation are negligible, as less than 1 per cent of group-level average bids are 0 or 1000, the model is estimated by OLS. Standard errors are clustered by independent groups of four individuals. Table 4 reports estimation results for alternative specifications of equation (1). Column (1) focuses on the joint effect of exclusion and inclusion errors, i.e., adjudication errors (δ 1 + δ 2 + δ 3 ). The estimated effect of adjudication errors is large (-212.3 euro cents) and strongly significant. Column (2) reports the estimated effects of exclusion and inclusion errors, respectively, under the assumption of additivity (δ 3 = 0). Both exclusion and inclusion errors have a negative and significant effect on bids (δ 1 = −103.0 andδ 2 = −109.2, respectively). Column (3) relaxes the assumption of additivity, indicating the auction and finds over-dissipation only in the former.
23 Other experimental studies on symmetric all-pay auctions are Ong and Chen (1998), Ernst and Thoni (2013) , Lugovsky et al. (2010) , Klose and Sheremeta (2012) . 24 The existence of a cap on bids is one of the arguments provided by Potters et al. (1998) to explain why they do not find strong evidence in favor of overbidding in an all-pay auction setting that shares some crucial characteristics with ours: the same number of bidders, the same matching protocol (random and anonymous matching), and a large number of rounds that is at least as twice as in other studies (30 in their experiment). In every round subjects are endowed with an amount of money that is slightly above the prize value and this cap may exert a stronger pressure on average bids with respect to Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006) design, making Potters et al. (1998) results more similar to ours. presence of a negative interaction between exclusion and inclusion errors (δ 3 = 67.3 has the opposite sign of the main effects). Exclusion and inclusion errors are therefore substitutes, as the sum of the effects of the two error components is larger (in absolute value) than the effect of adjudication errors. Column (4) reports the estimated difference between the effects of exclusion and inclusion errors (δ 1 − δ 2 ). The estimated coefficient is small (6.2) and the null hypothesis that exclusion and inclusion errors have the same disincentive effect on bids cannot be rejected. Note: dependent variable: average group-level bids in euro cents; OLS estimates; the set of regressors also includes dummy variables for short and long term experience, and a full set of session dummy variables; standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered by independent matching group; * indicates p < 0.05, ** indicates p < 0.01. Table 5 assesses how repetition interacts with the effects of judgement errors, by comparing treatment effects between rounds 1-5 and 6-10 (short term experience), and between periods 1-20 and 21-40 (long term experience). Both short and long term experience increase the size of the effect of adjudication errors. A similar result holds for the effects of both exclusion and inclusion errors. The interaction between exclusion and inclusion errors becomes stronger and statistically significant when subjects are more experienced. This indicates that the evidence of non-additivity is reinforced by experience. Finally, the difference between the effects of exclusion and exclusion errors is positively related to long term experience (-74.2 and +52.3 in periods 1-20 and 21-40, respectively). Table 6 reports average bids, by treatment and framing, and, in column (3), the difference in average bids between Penalty and Prize framings. The results indicate that bids are significantly higher in Penalty than in Prize both in the absence of errors (T1) and in the presence of adjudication errors (T4). The difference is positive but non significant under either exclusion or inclusion errors. Table 7 compares the effects of judgement errors across framings. The effects of adjudication errors are relatively similar in Penalty and Prize framings (-206.5 and -218 .1 euro cents, respectively). Consistently with the theoretical predictions, the disincentive effects of both exclusion and inclusion errors are stronger in Penalty (-149.9 and -164.7 Note: dependent variable: average group-level bids in euro cents; OLS estimates; the set of regressors also includes dummy variables for short and long term experience, and a full set of session dummy variables; standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered by independent matching group; * indicates p < 0.05, ** indicates p < 0.01. Note: dependent variable: average group-level bids in euro cents; OLS estimates; the set of regressors also includes dummy variables for short and long term experience, and a full set of session dummy variables; standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered by independent matching group; * indicates p < 0.05, ** indicates p < 0.01. euro cents, respectively) than in Prize framing (-123.4 and -121 .1 euro cents, respectively). The difference, however, is not statistically significant. Interestingly, the positive interaction between exclusion and inclusion errors is large (108.1) and strongly significant in Penalty, but small (26.4) and not significant in Prize. The difference between the effects of exclusion and inclusion errors is small and not statistically significant in both Penalty and Prize framings.
Framing of Incentives
The main results about the effects of the framing of the incentive scheme can be summarized as follows. On the one hand, bids are higher in a Penalty than in a Prize incentive Note: dependent variable: average group-level bids in euro cents; OLS estimates; the set of regressors also includes dummy variables for short and long term experience, and a full set of session dummy variables; standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered by independent matching group; * indicates p < 0.05, ** indicates p < 0.01.
scheme, both in the absence of judgement errors and in the presence of adjudication errors. On the other hand, there is no significant interaction between the framing of the incentive mechanism and the effects of mis-judgements.
Conclusion
We studied the disincentive effects of mis-judgements in the strategic context of an all-pay auction, focusing on the respective effects of the exclusion and inclusion components of adjudication errors. At the theoretical level, we have shown how behavioral aspects, such as risk aversion, loss aversion and the framing of the incentive scheme shape the effects of judgement errors on effort. Due to risk aversion, the negative effect of exclusion dominates the one of inclusion in both positive and negative incentive schemes. Loss aversion interacts with the effects of errors in different ways in the two reward schemes: in prize schemes exclusion dominates inclusion, while in penalty schemes exclusion has either the same or a less strong effect than inclusion. The comparison of bidding behavior across the two framings suggests that loss averse bidders bid more aggressively and perceive adjudication errors as more detrimental in a penalty scheme than in a prize scheme. We tested experimentally the effects of an adjudication error, factorized in its exclusion and inclusion components. The results indicate that adjudication errors negatively affect average bids under both positive and negative incentive schemes. Moreover, bidding behavior is more aggressive in a penalty than in a prize scheme. However, in both reward schemes, the effects of exclusion and inclusion are not significantly different, in contrast with the implications of behavioral aspects like risk and loss aversion. Therefore, penalizing (or not rewarding) the best candidate (exclusion error) is not perceived as more frustrating than not penalizing (or rewarding) the worst candidate (inclusion error).
This result sheds light on how to design incentive schemes in the presence of adjudi-cation errors. When contest organizers internalize that they can incur into adjudication errors, and bear the cost of incentives, they may want to adjust their strategy. To avoid erroneous adjudications, they can adopt more strict (not rewarding anyone) or lenient (rewarding both) criteria. Our experimental evidence shows that exclusion errors can be preferable for contest organizers, since they are not more harmful than inclusion errors, irrespective of the framing of the incentive scheme, while they are generally less costly. A second finding of our experiment is that subjects bid more aggressively under a penalty incentive scheme than under an equivalent prize-based incentive scheme, a feature that has received relatively little attention in the experimental literature on contests. This is an important result for the design of optimal incentive mechanisms in competitive environments. 25 Several recent studies have provided evidence that loss contractswhereby penalties are assigned for not reaching a productivity target -increase workplace individual performance, both in the lab and in the field (Brooks, et al., 2011; Hossain and List, 2012; Fryer et al., 2012; Armantier and Boly, 2015) . 26 Studies of the effects of gain and loss schemes on effort in competitive settings have generally limited their attention to work team contests. While in Dickinson (2001) prizes and fines are assigned to high and low contributors to the team goal, in Hong et al. (2015) rewards and punishments are assigned to the team overall, depending on its performance, and equally redistributed among its members. However, in both cases, individual effort can be driven by social concerns for the partners' payoffs that are completely absent in a context like the one we implemented, whereby competition occurs at the individual level.
Our results also show that, although the framing of the incentive scheme may affect effort levels, it does not interact with judgement errors. While contest organizers can extract more effort by adopting a penalty scheme instead of a prize scheme, the disincentive effects of judgement errors are not stronger in a penalty scheme relative to a prize scheme.
Our paper sheds light on the mechanisms through which adjudication errors affect effort in contests. It also suggests fruitful avenues for future research, as errors can affect many relevant strategic contexts (e.g., labor market, education, scientific dissemination, political lobbying or elections) and have a significant economic impact. Moreover, in many competitions (e.g., for bonuses in the workplace or job positions) the contested resources may not be determined with certainty. There might be uncertainty at the competition stage on whether contested resources will remain the same or change at the awarding stage, especially in periods of high economic volatility. Our study opens the way to analyzing contests that incorporate uncertainty about the size of contested resources.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 5.
Denote b E and b I the upper bounds of the support of F E (·) and F I (·) respectively. As b takes only positive values, we derive the expected bids in the two settings from the survival function and obtain:
It holds true that
due to concavity of u(·).
To show that b E < b I we first consider that b E solves:
where the left hand side is the expected utility from bidding exactly b E and thus winning, while the right hand side is the expected utility from bidding 0 and losing. Similarly, b I solves the indifference condition:
It is enough to find some bid b in the support of F I (·) such that condition 13 evaluated in b becomes:
We can exclude that b I = (1 − p)π -as it does not satisfy condition 14.
Then, bidding (1 − p)π should make bidders worse off than bidding 0, that is
By definition of risk aversion
which leads to a contradiction. Thus, it must be the case that
Secondly, we observe that b E ≤ (1 − p)π which implies that:
Indeed, by definition of risk aversion the following relation holds
Thus, since b I > (1 − p)π and b E ≤ (1 − p)π it must be the case that b I > b E , which together with condition 12 implies that
Proof of Proposition 6. To prove this result, we examine the relation between the equilibrium distribution function in the exclusion and inclusion error scenarios with loss averse bidders. In particular, F E (b) ≥ F I (b) if, and only if
The last inequality holds true both with linear and concave u(·). Notice that when u(·) is linear, u(b) = u(π)−u(π−b). Thus, for any λ ≥ 1, such that λu(b) ≥ u(b), the inequality holds true. With concave u(·), it holds that λu(b) ≥ u(b) ≥ u(π) − u(π − b), whereby the last relation is satisfied due to diminishing marginal utility (with strict inequality for strict concavity). 27 We need to show now that b
while b I solves
If we evaluate condition (15) in b I it must be the case that
Notice that due to condition (16) and to concavity the last condition becomes
To show that the last relation holds true it is enough to show that b I > (1 − p)π by arguing that it cannot be otherwise. Indeed (1 − p)π does not satisfy condition (16). Moreover, due to concavity
This result together with
Proof of Proposition 11. We need to show that
that is, the average equilibrium bid under inclusion errors is smaller or equal to the average equilibrium bid under exclusion errors.
It is immediate to show that G I (b) ≥ G E (b) for every b. Indeed, the following relation
holds true, since when u(x) is linear
while when u(x) is concave
To complete the proof, we also need to show that b I ≤ b E . It is immediate to show that the two upper bounds coincide under linearity of u(·). Suppose that u(·) is concave. We show that b I < b E . Notice that under loss aversion b E solves
while b I solves u(b I ) = (1 − p)u(π).
We can show that condition ( Periods 1 -10
• The participant in the pair who buys most tickets wins the contest (in case of a tie, the winner is randomly drawn by the computer with probability 1 2 ).
• The winner obtains the prize, the loser does not obtain the prize.
Example
You buy a tickets and the other participant buys b, where a > b. Hence, you won the contest. Therefore:
• you obtain the prize and earn: 1000 (endowment) − a (tickets expenditure) +1000 (prize) = 2000 − a (period earnings in ECU)
• the other participant does not obtain the prize and earns: 1000 (endowment) −b (tickets expenditure) = 1000 − b (period earnings in ECU)
Periods 11 -20
• When assigning the prize an error may occur: with probability 1 4 the winner does not obtain the prize. Thus:
-if no error occurs (with probability 3 4 ), the winner obtain the prize and the loser does not obtain it.
-if the error occurs (with probability 1 4 ), the winner does not obtain the prize and the loser does not obtain the prize (that is none obtains the prize).
• The computer will determine whether the error occurs depending on the realization of two coin tosses that will be shown on the screen as illustrated in the figure below. If the realization is (head, head), an error occurs; if the realization is not (head, head), no error occurs.
• The computer will determine whether the error occurs depending on the realization of two coin tosses that will be shown on the screen as illustrated in the figure below. If the realization is (head, head), an error occurs; if the realization is not (head, head), no error occurs. • Whatever the realization of the coin tosses, you obtain the prize and earn: 1000 (endowment) −a (tickets expenditure) +1000 (prize) = 2000 − a (period earnings in ECU)
• If no error occurs the other participant, who lost the contest, does not obtain the prize and earns: 1000 (endowment −b (tickets expenditure) = 1000 − b (periods earnings in ECU)
• If an error occurs also the other participant obtains the prize and earns: 1000 (endowment) −b (tickets expenditure) +1000 (prize) = 2000 − b (period earnings in ECU)
Periods 31 -40
• When assigning the prize an error may occur: with probability 1 4 the winner does not obtain the prize and the loser obtains the prize. Thus:
-if no error occurs (with probability 3 4 ), the winner obtains the prize and the loser does not obtain the prize.
-if an error occurs (with probability 1 4 ), the winner does not obtain the prize and the loser obtains the prize.
• The computer will determine whether the error occurs depending on the realization of two coin tosses that will be shown on the screen as illustrated in the figure below. If the realization is (head, head), an error occurs; if the realization is not (head, head), no error occurs. • you obtain the prize and earn: 1000 (endowment) −a (tickets expenditure) +1000 (prize) = 2000 − a (period earnings in ECU)
• the other participant does not obtain the prize and earns: 1000 (endowment) −b (tickets expenditure) = 1000 − b(period earnings in ECU)
If an error occurs:
• you do not obtain the prize and earn: 1000 (endowment) −a (tickets expenditure) = 1000 − a (period earnings in ECU)
• the other participant obtains the prize and earns: 1000 (endowment) −b (tickets expenditure) +1000 (prize) = 2000 − b (period earnings in ECU)
Instructions for the Penalty framing [translated from Italian] Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. By closely following our instructions you will have the chance to earn an amount of money that will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment. You are not allowed to talk or communicate with other participants. If you have any questions, raise your hand and an assistant will help you. The following rules apply to all participants.
General instructions
• The experiment consists of 40 periods.
• In each period: -You will be assigned to a group of 2 participants, randomly and anonymously paired, and, given your choices and the choices of the other participant, you will have the chance to earn an amount in ECU (100 ECU = 1 EURO).
-Every participant has a monetary endowment of 2000 ECU (20 euro) and participates in a contest where, without observing the choices of the other participant, he/she has to decide how many tickets to buy from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 1000, at the cost of 1 ECU per ticket.
-The participant who buys most tickets wins the contest and obtains a prize of 1000 ECU (10 euro) given some rules that are illustrated below.
-The participant who buys least tickets loses the contest and obtains a penaly of 1000 ECU (10 euro) given some rules that are illustrated below.
-Earnings are determined in the following way: PROFIT = ENDOWMENT -TICKETS EXPENDITURE -PENALTY (IF ANY)
Notice that the ticket expenditure will be subtracted to your final earnings independently of whether you obtain the penalty or not.
• At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly draw one period.
• Earnings obtained in the selected period, plus 2 euro for filling a questionnaire at the end of the experiment, will be paid in cash.
Periods 1 -10
• The participant who buys least tickets loses the contest (in case of a tie, the loser is randomly drawn by the computer with probability 1 2 ).
• The loser obtains a penalty, the winner does not obtain a penalty.
